Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

2012

Dean's Column: Unchain the Children
Mary Berkheiser
University of Nevada, Las Vegas -- William S. Boyd School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub
Part of the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Berkheiser, Mary, "Dean's Column: Unchain the Children" (2012). Scholarly Works. 839.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/839

This Article is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository administered
by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact
youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

I~.
0

W

/

..4

~

~.v.U

.2 U

U U

"If the presumption of innocence is to
mean anything for juveniles brought
before the court in Clark County,
we must unchain them."
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BY GUEST WRITER PROF. MARY BERKHEISER

UNCHAIN THE CHILDREN
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court held in In re
Gault that due process is not for adults alone, but applies to
juveniles too.' Announcing its profound conclusion, the court
noted the history and purpose of the juvenile court: "The
child was to be 'treated' and rehabilitated, and the procedures,
from apprehension through institutionalization, were to be
'clinical' rather than punitive." 2 In Nevada, as in every other
state, the juvenile justice system continues to treat children
differently from adults and to serve the goals of treatment
and rehabilitation that are central to its existence. When the
Nevada Legislature established the state's juvenile courts, it
declared that the laws "must be liberally construed to the end
that: (a) fach child who is subject to the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court must receive such care, guidance and control
... as will be conducive to the child's welfare."' Thus, the
welfare of the child was to be the heart of the due process that
animates juvenile court proceedings.
Fast-forward to 2012 and the Clark County Juvenile
Court. In any courtroom, a parade of juveniles of all ages and
sizes, male and female, come before the hearing masters on
any given day. Although each of these children or adolescents
brings his or her unique set of issues to the court, one thing
marks them all as one and the same: Every one of them,
regardless of age - some as young as 8 years old - alleged

offense or juvenile history, is in shackles: a belly chain with
handcuffs locked at the waist and another set of chains around
their ankles. These children drag their feet as they enter the
courtroom so they will not trip over the ankle chains and fall
to the floor. Meanwhile, in each courtroom stands a marshal
who is armed for any eventuality, wearing a gun, a Taser, a can
of mace and a number of other implements of control. On one
day in particular, when our client is going to trial, we ask the
hearing master to permit him to be unchained during the trial
so that he can take notes and not feel that he's been condemned
already. The hearing master denies our request. Our client has
a difficult time believing that the presumption of innocence
still cloaks him when all he can feel are chains.
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Nevada is not alone in its practice of indiscriminately
shackling juveniles.' Two-thirds of the states shackle all
juveniles without any demonstration that the need to do so
(such as danger or risk of flight) exists.' However, in recent
years a number of states have moved to prohibit the blanket use
of shackling through case law, court rule or legislation.
California was one of the first states to act through its
appellate court. In In re Tiffany, the court found blanket
juvenile shackling policies unconstitutional because they
violated "the constitutional presumption of innocence, the right
to present and participate in the defense and the interest in
maintaining human dignity."' The court ruled that the decision
to shackle must be made on a case-by-case basis and cannot be
justified by "the inadequacy of courtroom facilities or the lack
of available security personnel to monitor them."'
Florida reached the same result as California, though via
a different route: the rule-making power of the state supreme
court. In 2009, the Florida Supreme Court issued a new
delinquency rule banning shackling absent a finding that the
use of restraints was necessary because of a substantial risk of
harm to the child or others or a substantial risk of flight.' The
Florida Supreme Court made clear the reason for the new rule:
"We find the indiscriminate shackling of children in Florida
courtrooms ... repugnant, degrading, humiliating, and contrary
to the stated purposes of the juvenile justice system and to the
principles of therapeutic justice."'
Other states have prohibited indiscriminate shackling
through legislation. North Carolina provides one example: "At
any hearing authorized or required by this subchapter, the judge
may subject a juvenile to physical restraint in the courtroom only
when thejudgefinds the restraint to be reasonably necessary to
maintain order, prevent the juvenile's escape or provide for the
safety of the courtroom." 0 Like other statutes, rules of court and
appellate decisions, this legislation requires an individualized
determination by the court of the necessity for physical restraints.
Thus, juveniles in these jurisdictions enter the courtroom free
of the psychological and physical weight of the chains that

still bind the children of Clark County
Juvenile Court.
No county in the state of Nevada
other than Clark has a blanket
shackling policy. It is not a creature of
the legislature or of the juvenile court;
indeed, the source of the policy when and why it came into being - has
proven difficult to pin down. What
is not difficult to grasp, however, is
the harm that the continued use of
shackling in Clark County causes
children every day they appear in
court. Shackling treats children like
wild animals, not like people that the
juvenile justice system is duty bound
to protect. Moreover, it denies children
the due process protections that Gault
and its progeny established decades
ago. If the presumption of innocence is
to mean anything for juveniles brought
before the court in Clark County, we
must unchain them. Then, and only
then, can the juvenile justice system
begin to fulfill its mission. E
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